Mao

[The Wiseman]

Me, Bob, and Nayiri were debating about Mao in the chatroom. Knowing how the chatroom is and conversations always get jumbled, I thought to create a threat for organized debate.

Now first off I just want to make the point that I don't like Mao nor his party dictatorship. China was not any sort of actual example of communism, it was state capitalist to the core and the party hiearchy lived a far more lavish lifestyle than the average worker/peasant. Any sort of workers' attempt to directly control the means of production was obliterated like the Shanghai Commune of 1967. That being said, despite his tyranny Mao was superior to the previous Western-backed feudal governments that preceded his rule. I am an anarchist but this does not mean I can sit back and let false claims that support imperialist intervention go unchecked.

Killing Hope: Chapter 1 China 1945-1960s

Mao had a perfect excuse to not allow freedom of speech and expression in China, the U.S. intervention after World War II from Japan basically led to "Mao's paranoia" which was perfectly understandable. The U.S. invaded China and massacred villages in Communist-controlled territory while providing full support to the Chinese nationalists. The nationalists went into exile in Taiwan and southern Asia where the CIA formed an army on the doorstep of China that carried out multiple failed invasions. You can't exclude the U.S. stronghold in South Korea, Japan, the Phillipines, and South Vietnam that basically left China surrounded. Do you really expect freedom and democracy to flourish in a revolution strangled from birth, embargoed, and completely surrounded by an aggressive enemy?

http://www.spectrezine.org/global/chomsky.htm

He observes that India and China had "similarities that were quite striking" when development planning began 50 years ago, including death rates. "But there is little doubt that as far as morbidity, mortality and longevity are concerned, China has a large and decisive lead over India" (in education and other social indicators as well). He estimates the excess of mortality in India over China to be close to 4 million a year: "India seems to manage to fill its cupboard with more skeletons every eight years than China put there in its years of shame," 1958-1961 (Dreze and Sen).

In both cases, the outcomes have to do with the "ideological predispositions" of the political systems: for China, relatively equitable distribution of medical resources, including rural health services, and public distribution of food, all lacking in India. This was before 1979, when "the downward trend in mortality [in China] has been at least halted, and possibly reversed," thanks to the market reforms instituted that year.

Overcoming amnesia, suppose we now apply the methodology of the Black Book and its reviewers to the full story, not just the doctrinally acceptable half. We therefore conclude that in India the democratic capitalist "experiment" since 1947 has caused more deaths than in the entire history of the "colossal, wholly failed...experiment" of Communism everywhere since 1917: over 100 million deaths by 1979, tens of millions more since, in India alone.

- Between 1949 and 1975, life expectancy in socialist China more than doubled, from about 32 to 65 years.

- By the early 1970s, infant mortality rates in Shanghai were lower than in New York City.

- Literacy swelled in the span of one generation--from about 15 percent in 1949 to some 80 to 90 percent in the mid-1970s

- Agriculture grew by some 3 percent a year, slightly exceeding population growth. By 1970, the problem of adequately feeding China's population had been solved. This was accomplished through integrated economic planning, a system of collective agriculture that promoted grass-roots mobilization, flood control, steady investment in rural infrastructure, and the equitable distribution of food to peasants and rationing of essential foods so that all people were guaranteed their minimal requirements.

- China's industrial economy under Mao grew impressively--at an average rate of 10 percent per year, even during the Cultural Revolution. China, the former "sick man of Asia," transformed itself into a major industrial power in the quarter century between 1949 and 1976--a rate of development comparable only to the greatest surges of growth in history.

[Bob]

Note, China's economic liberalization too place during the late 70s. In other words, much of these strides were under Moa rule (up to 1976):

- Between 1949 and 1975, life expectancy in socialist China more than doubled, from about 32 to 65 years.

- By the early 1970s, infant mortality rates in Shanghai were lower than in New York City.

- Literacy swelled in the span of one generation--from about 15 percent in 1949 to some 80 to 90 percent in the mid-1970s

The idea that Mao is some cold tyrant is baseless at best. While he wasn't a progressive, the policies he introduced produced superior results than those implemented by the Western-back feudal regimes.

Third, keep in mind that Western intellectuals include a large number of hypocrites. Many of the intellectual brass actively promote European imperialism in the academic realm. The popular myth: China' socio-economic prosperity is due to economic liberalization is a myth. The largest gains were made during the rule under Mao.

PS: Let's see how this goes.

[Nayiri]

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s a number of widespread changes occurred in China's economic policies and priorities…Many new factories were built with Soviet technical and financial assistance, as they could not be purely supported by domestic resources…

During the first policy plan fast growth in heavy industry was achieved, but a few months after the introduction of the Second Five-Year Plan (1958-1962), which was to be on the same lines as the First, the policy of the Great Leap Forward was announced. In agriculture, this involved the formation of people's communes, the abolition of private plots, and the increasing of output through greater cooperation and physical effort. Construction of large factories was to be continued apace, and in addition to that was the initiative to create a massive auxiliary network of simple, small-scale industries and plants that were built and managed locally.

However, the Chinese peasantry was unprepared for this communal system, and a plunge in agricultural output soon followed.[21]. Concurrently, the irregular and haphazard backyard production drive failed to achieve the intended objectives as it turned out enormous quantities of expensively produced, low quality goods, most notably steel produced from low quality iron which can not be used to build. During that time, these failures were exacerbated all the more by the Sino-Soviet split which caused the cancellation of Soviet assistance which had provided technicians and blueprints.

In consequence, by late 1960 the country was in the throes of an economic and humanitarian disaster. Mao Zedong self-exiled from politics and was succeeded by Liu Shaoqi, who made a complete about-turn in policy. He criticized the disasters as "30% fault of nature, 70% human error." Private plots were restored, the size of the communes was reduced, and greater independence was given to the production team. There was also a mass transfer of the unemployed from industry to the countryside, and industrial investment was temporarily slashed in order to free resources for farm production.[22]

This policy, which led to an immediate improvement in the agricultural situation, was maintained until 1963, when it again became possible to redirect some resources to the capital goods industry. As a result, industrial production and construction gathered some momentum, but due effort was taken to try to avoid the earlier mistake of sacrificing food production to iron and steel and similar industries.

Then, in 1966 the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" began, initially as a campaign for Mao to retake power from Liu Shaoqi and to "eliminate the liberal bourgeoisie" from the Party. Unlike the Great Leap Foward, the Cultural Revolution did not have an explicit economic rationale. Nevertheless, industrial production was badly affected by the ensuing confusion and strife, when hundreds of millions of people simply stopped working, while notable politicians, factory owners, and even teachers were victims to the massive "uprisings.

The Cultural Revolution left some problematic legacies for the economy.[24] In industry, wages had been frozen and bonuses cancelled. This had, when combined with the policies of employing more workers than necessary to absorb unemployment and hiring workers on a permanent basis, essentially eliminated incentives to work hard.[25] In addition, technicians and many managers lost their authority and could not play an effective role in production in the wake of the movement. The entire urban system, moreover, provided less than minimal incentives to achieve efficiency in production.[25] While overall output continued to grow, capital-output ratios declined. In agriculture, per capita output in 1977 was no higher than in 1957.

Year   Gross domestic product   US dollar exchange
1955   91,000                                       2.46   
1960   145,700                                       2.46   
1965   171,600                                       2.46   
1970   225,300                                       2.46   
1975   299,700                                       1.86   
1980   460,906                                       1.49   
1985   896,440                                       2.93   
1990   1,854,790                          4.78   
1995   6,079,400                          8.35   
2000   9,921,500                          8.27   
2005   18,308,500                          8.19   
   

China’s massive population has always been a major difficulty for the government as it has struggled to provide for it. In the 1950s, food supply was inadequate and the standard of living was generally low. This spurred the authorities to initiate a major birth control program. The Great Leap Forward industrial plan in 1958-60 caused a huge famine which caused the death rate to surpass the birth rate and by 1960, the overall population was declining.

[Nayiri]

The bulk of the deaths for which Mao was responsible stemmed from the famines caused by his mad agricultural collectivization program, which surpassed even Stalin's in its totalitarian aspirations. Like Lenin, Mao initially let peasants keep their land; he focused on killing or imprisoning landlords, better- off peasants, and other village leaders who might later resist him. This lasted for a few years; then Mao began to seize the land that he had promised the peasants, and force them into collective farms along Stalinist lines. The job was basically complete by 1956. These collective farms seemed too individualistic to Mao, so he went one step further in 1958 and forced the peasants into "communes." The difference was mainly that all property, not merely the land, became state property:


The peasant was now the property of the commune, to labor like factory workers in teams and brigades at whatever was commanded, to eat in common mess halls, and often to sleep together in barracks. Family life and traditions, personal property and privacy, personal initiative and individual freedom, were destroyed or lost in an instant for around one-seventh of all mankind. (R.J. Rummel, China's Bloody Century)

The communes were just one piece of Mao's overarching plan, the Great Leap Forward. Mao's stated goal was to make enormous advances in agriculture and industry simultaneously. Thus, in addition to setting large food quotas for the communes, villages were also ordered to set up small-scale steel furnaces - using local scrap metal as raw material. The pressure to surpass Mao's quotas led to little production but a great deal of falsified economic statistics. The false numbers were then used in future government plans, exacerbating the disaster which was to come.

Starvation had already set in during the forced collectivization period, just as it had under Stalin. Around five million perished from starvation even before the Great Leap Forward began. The Great Leap Forward turned this river of deaths into a flood, producing what was probably the single greatest famine in human history. From 1959-1963, around 30 million Chinese perished from this man- made famine. While exclusion of foreigners and draconian censorship kept word of this famine from the West for many years, in recent periods historians, demographers, and the Chinese government itself have given the world ample evidence of Mao's most horrible crime. Yet at the time experts were incredulous. "A BBC commentator - giving the opinion general among China experts - declared that widespread famine in such a well-organized country was unthinkable." (Laszlo Ladany, The Communist Party of China and Marxism: 1921-1985) The stories of recent emigres were shocking:


Peasants lacked the strength to work, and some collapsed in the fields and died. City government organisations and schools sent people to the villages by night to buy food, bartering clothes and furniture for it. In Shenyang the newspaper reported cannibalism. Desperate mothers strangled children who cried for food. Many reported that villagers were flocking into the cities in search of food; many villages were left empty, only the old people who were not strong enough to go into the cities being left behind. It was also said that peasants were digging underground pits to hide their food. (Laszlo Ladany, The Communist Party of China and Marxism: 1921-1985)
Insofar as official sources admitted existence of the famine following the Great Leap Forward, it was usually blamed on bad weather - just as the man-made famines of Lenin and Stalin had been. Natural forces did play a small role: perhaps 1 million of the 30 million deaths could be attributed to natural disasters. The deluded zealotry of Mao killed the rest. While even some unsympathetic scholars argue that Mao's famine, unlike Stalin's, does not qualify as murder, the case for Mao's personal guilt is strong. Mao's famine does not seem to have been created for its own sake as Stalin's was. Yet Mao had the experience of both Lenin and Stalin behind him, and knew full-well that collectivization often leads to mass death. He implemented his policies at gunpoint with full knowledge of these risks. Rummel points out that Mao's government tried to alleviate the famine once it was aware of it, but millions had died even before the Great Leap Forward began. In response Mao simply accelerated his pace - revealing the requisite mens rea for murder.

[Bob]

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s a number of widespread changes occurred in China's economic policies and priorities…Many new factories were built with Soviet technical and financial assistance, as they could not be purely supported by domestic resources…

China is a poor nation with a limited technology base. That is why it required financial and technical assistance from the Russia.

However, the Chinese peasantry was unprepared for this communal system, and a plunge in agricultural output soon followed.[21]. Concurrently, the irregular and haphazard backyard production drive failed to achieve the intended objectives as it turned out enormous quantities of expensively produced, low quality goods, most notably steel produced from low quality iron which can not be used to build. During that time, these failures were exacerbated all the more by the Sino-Soviet split which caused the cancellation of Soviet assistance which had provided technicians and blueprints.

Developing self-sustainability in agriculture is expensive. It's often not profitable short-term, because cheaper Western sources are available. Why? Because the West has an established agriculture sector and produce a surplus.

Second, even the US's dynamic state sector is a cost taker. It does not produce profit and hence is sustained by public funds. If we took the passage's logic, is US's state sector inefficient? Yes, if we look at raw costs, but it produces a technology foundation not present in the US before. In that case, it's worth it, and just for China, provides a base for further growth.

In consequence, by late 1960 the country was in the throes of an economic and humanitarian disaster. Mao Zedong self-exiled from politics and was succeeded by Liu Shaoqi, who made a complete about-turn in policy. He criticized the disasters as "30% fault of nature, 70% human error." Private plots were restored, the size of the communes was reduced, and greater independence was given to the production team. There was also a mass transfer of the unemployed from industry to the countryside, and industrial investment was temporarily slashed in order to free resources for farm production.[22]

Yet we see a rise in education, and health care in the same period? No one here is suggesting that Mao's economic policies were sound. It obviously wasn't. Look at China's weak banking sector of today. It represents poor management in Capitalist China that was inherited from Mao's China.

Also remember what Wiseman said? He asked how much of the death toll is due to poor economic policy, versus an organized organized ala Armenian genocide. That's where we differed, and I see no need to continue any further than this.

This policy, which led to an immediate improvement in the agricultural situation, was maintained until 1963, when it again became possible to redirect some resources to the capital goods industry. As a result, industrial production and construction gathered some momentum, but due effort was taken to try to avoid the earlier mistake of sacrificing food production to iron and steel and similar industries.

I suggest you to take a look at the development of these sectors in the West. Take Nazi Germany for instance. The state increased spending on developing self-sustainability in industries and manufacturing, and yes, it was highly costly. It is more effective to acquire these goods from Britain, but that's obviously not sustainability.

Then, in 1966 the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" began, initially as a campaign for Mao to retake power from Liu Shaoqi and to "eliminate the liberal bourgeoisie" from the Party. Unlike the Great Leap Foward, the Cultural Revolution did not have an explicit economic rationale. Nevertheless, industrial production was badly affected by the ensuing confusion and strife, when hundreds of millions of people simply stopped working, while notable politicians, factory owners, and even teachers were victims to the massive "uprisings.

The Cultural Revolution left some problematic legacies for the economy.[24] In industry, wages had been frozen and bonuses cancelled. This had, when combined with the policies of employing more workers than necessary to absorb unemployment and hiring workers on a permanent basis, essentially eliminated incentives to work hard.[25] In addition, technicians and many managers lost their authority and could not play an effective role in production in the wake of the movement. The entire urban system, moreover, provided less than minimal incentives to achieve efficiency in production.[25] While overall output continued to grow, capital-output ratios declined. In agriculture, per capita output in 1977 was no higher than in 1957.

And I ask, why do we see a rise in health? It's because even though productivity (per capita output) was lower, the sector covered a large population. That means a greater overall output. This should only matter, imo, and honestly, where did you get this source from? It just reeks of neo-liberal economics.

Year   Gross domestic product   US dollar exchange
1955   91,000                                       2.46   
1960   145,700                                       2.46   
1965   171,600                                       2.46   
1970   225,300                                       2.46   
1975   299,700                                       1.86   
1980   460,906                                       1.49   
1985   896,440                                       2.93   
1990   1,854,790                          4.78   
1995   6,079,400                          8.35   
2000   9,921,500                          8.27   
2005   18,308,500                          8.1

Irrelevant figure. Why are we looking at GDP which is obviously largely corporate or state-based? The GDP of Mexico is far greater than Cuba, and yet the former does far better socio-economically. In other words a sustainable community
   

China’s massive population has always been a major difficulty for the government as it has struggled to provide for it. In the 1950s, food supply was inadequate and the standard of living was generally low. This spurred the authorities to initiate a major birth control program. The Great Leap Forward industrial plan in 1958-60 caused a huge famine which caused the death rate to surpass the birth rate and by 1960, the overall population was declining.

Does that oppose our views? China's famine were the result of government mismanagement. No one here is suggesting that Mao was an economic genius when clearly PRC is not, arguably, even today.

[kittenslayer]

thanks guys, I've learnt a quite few new things and rationales.  I've read various pro-communist or anti-communist books by Chinese authors.  Yet they all missed some of the good points you pointed out.

Not you Nayiri tho, all the stuff you said are the usual biased Western narrative.

[Bob]

By ignoring the Western embargo that began in 1949 during the revolution right towards 1963. The development of social infrastructure, while inherently cost, was intensified due to economic sanctions. That played a strong role in the famines during the Great Leap Forward. China being barred from accessing Western technologies that would increase fertilizer yields did restrict development.

That said, if we want to talk about policies that result to disaster: no look further at the Vatican. They've promoted a policy against the use of contraceptions which has devastated HIV-ridden Africa. In this case we have a policy promoted by the Church that clearly results to mass death and no foreign forces are involved. The use of contraceptions have been proven to reduce HIV transmission effectively, but due to the Church's stance, millions are (will be) dying.

[The Wiseman]

By ignoring the Western embargo that began in 1949 during the revolution right towards 1963. The development of social infrastructure, while inherently cost, was intensified due to economic sanctions. That played a strong role in the famines during the Great Leap Forward. China being barred from accessing Western technologies that would increase fertilizer yields did restrict development.

The Great Leap Forward: Not All Bad

With Soviet withdrawal of aid and the U.S. trade embargo, China was practically forced to engage in a labor-intensive, low capital program to increase industrial output or effectively industrialize the economy. The Great Leap Forward made perfect sense at the time of its implementation. Not to mention, grain imports were restricted from Australia and Canadia by the U.S. embargo. The U.S. navy blocked the shipping routes to China, heavily restricting sufficient grain that would have otherwise been imported to stop the famine. The U.S. navy is still in an important position today with military ties to Singapore and Taiwan. They are in a strategic position to blockade importing oil tankers at any time, thats why the Chinese are developing strings of naval bases in the surrounding oceans/seas and looking for energy transportation in-land through oil pipelines. Hence the double-edged sword of increasing U.S. interest in Central Asia as resource control for U.S. multinationals and weakening Russia/China who heavily rely on Caspian oil.

The Globalization of Military Power: NATO Expansion